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Abstract: This article is based on a theoretical-conceptual framework and empirically grounded 
research to analyze the construction of discourse and institutional insertion of ideas from epistem-
ic communities of fiscal austerity in Brazil, given the recent upsurge in liberal-orthodox policies 
and their repercussions for the welfare state. The study explores who these actors and institutions 
are, how they act, how they are organized, and who trains or finances them. The main objective is 
to unveil how the ideas in defense of fiscal constriction were formulated and disseminated, start-
ing after the first term (2003-2006) of President Lula da Siva’s government (2003-2010), when 
developmentalist policies replaced the neoliberal convention. The ideas of fiscal constriction were 
intensified during the government of President Dilma Rousseff (2011-2016), and gained charac-
teristics of a unified proposal, materialized in the austerity program Uma Ponte para o Futuro 
(2015) (a bridge to the future). After President Rousseff’s impeachment in 2016, policy-makers in 
the government President Michel Temer and his successor Jair Bolsonaro rapidly put forward the 
austerity program. The epistemic communities of fiscal austerity argue that the public policies 
outlined in the 1988 Brazilian Constitution are the main cause of the increase in spending on wel-
fare, the accelerated growth of public debt, and the probable insolvency of the country. 
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Estado de bem-estar social e 
“comunidades epistêmicas da austeridade fiscal” no Brasil: 
de Lula da Silva a Jair Bolsonaro (2003-2020)
Resumo: A partir de aparato teórico-conceitual e de pesquisa empiricamente alicerçada, este artigo 
analisa a construção discursiva e a inserção institucional das ideias das “comunidades epistêmicas 
da austeridade fiscal” no Brasil, tendo em vista o recente recrudescimento de políticas liberal-orto-
doxas e suas reverberações para o Estado do bem-estar social. Trata-se de investigar quem são es-
ses atores e instituições, como atuam, como se organizam, por quem são formados ou financiados. 
O principal objetivo é descobrir como suas ideias em defesa da constrição fiscal foram formuladas 
e disseminadas, a partir do final do primeiro mandato (2003-2006) do governo Lula da Silva (2003-
2010), quando da substituição da “convenção neoliberal” pela concepção desenvolvimentista, e in-
tensificadas no governo Dilma Rousseff (2011-2016). Tal discurso adquiriu um caráter unificado no 
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programa de austeridade “Uma ponte para o futuro” (2015), foi sacramentado na ruptura demo-
crática de 2016 e implementado com celeridade pelos policy-makers dos governos Michel Temer e 
Jair Bolsonaro. As “comunidades epistêmicas” argumentam que as políticas públicas preconizadas 
na Constituição Federal de 1988 são a principal causa da elevação dos gastos com bem-estar, do 
crescimento acelerado da dívida pública e da provável insolvência do Estado brasileiro. 
Palavras-chave: Estado de bem-estar social. Comunidades epistêmicas da austeridade fiscal. 
Constituição Federal de 1988. Políticas públicas. Brasil.
Introduction
This article analyzes the construction of discourse and institutional insertion of ideas of epistemic communities of fiscal austerity in Brazil and their reper-cussions for the country’s (incipient and currently endangered) welfare state. 
These epistemic communities are composed of large corporatist press and oligop-
olistic media, industrial entrepreneurs, orthodox economists, liberal-conservative 
parliamentary coalition, and sectors of the middle and upper classes who engaged 
in the demonstrations demanding the impeachment of President Rousseff in 2016. 
This study demonstrates how these ideas have unified around a liberal-conserva-
tive political-economic coalition that has governed Brazil since the 2016 democratic 
break and how they have influenced the Brazilian state regarding macroeconomic 
policy and implementation of public policies.
In addition to analyzing the epistemic communities’ discourse and practices, this re-
flection highlights the challenges of implementing welfare policies within financial 
globalization. In this context, financial intermediaries greatly benefit from taxpayers’ 
money. These resources are massively used to fund public debt rather than public 
investment, which means that large sums of public money end up with sharehold-
ers, financial institutions, and financial market investors. There is an immediate and 
short-term perspective of valuing financial investment to the detriment of produc-
tion and policies that streamline the economy, such as public investment in well-be-
ing and infrastructure, household consumption, and business investment. Financial-
ization is the mechanism through which money is channeled from savers (investors) 
to borrowers (families, companies, governments), and this mechanism imposes the 
austerity regime in Brazil (Davis & Kim, 2015; Dowbor, 2017; Streeck, 2019).
Because of the structural contingencies imposed by financial globalization, the 
Workers Party (PT) governments expressed concern about fiscal austerity. The pri-
mary fiscal surplus target in the first government of President Lula da Silva jumped 
from 3.75% to 4.25% of GDP. In this sense, it was as strict as President Cardoso’s 
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President Rousseff started her term with a contractionary fiscal policy, reducing 
credit, and increasing interest rates. This stagnated GDP between the second half 
of 2011 and the first half of 2012 (Bastos, 2017). Around August 2012, Rousseff 
adopted a model of productive development based on fiscal expansion through 
the so-called new macroeconomic matrix, as opposed to the immediatist perspec-
tive of financial capital. However, the model faced the political-economic elites’ 
resistance, and a severe fiscal (spending cut) and monetary (increase in interest 
rate to fight inflation) adjustment was adopted in 2015. The president’s heterodox 
experiment contradicted several interests, especially those of the financial sector 
and neoliberal ideologists, who came to play an important role in the parliamen-
tary coup of 2016. Later, these same actors integrated the economic bureaucracy 
of Michel Temer (2016-2018) and Jair Bolsonaro’s (2019 – current) governments.
The context that preceded the 2016 impeachment was marked by intense political 
instability. Aécio Neves (Brazilian Social Democracy Party – PSDB), the defeated 
candidate in the 2014 presidential elections, unexpectedly asked the Superior Elec-
toral Court (TSE) for a recount of votes. The president of the Chamber of Depu-
ties, Eduardo Cunha (at that time, member of the Party of the Brazilian Democratic 
Movement – PMDB of the State of Rio de Janeiro, which recently changed its de-
nomination removing the word “Party” – MDB), put in the parliament’s agenda a 
series of controversial issues, such as labor outsourcing regulation (PL 4330/04). 
Also, he led the parliament in approving extra expenses for public servants and 
pensioners, jeopardizing Rousseff’s fiscal adjustment policies (O Estado de S. Paulo, 
February 24, 2016; G1, October 30, 2014).
Against this backdrop, the questions addressed in this study are: 
i. What are epistemic communities of fiscal austerity, when were they 
formed, and how were they organized, systematically disseminating 
the rhetoric that social welfare spending is incompatible with the 
country’s GDP? 
ii. How were epistemic communities’ ideas1 inserted in the 1988 Bra-
zilian Constitution during Michel Temer and Jair Bolsonaro’s govern-
ments, and what are their impacts?
This study seeks to offer an original contribution to the public and academic debate, 
fill a gap in the literature, and advance knowledge about the political economy of 
public policies. The hypothesis suggested is that, from the end of President Lula da 
Silva’s (2003-2010) first mandate, in 2006, until the deposition of Dilma Rousseff 
(2011-2016) through a parliamentary coup d’État, an epistemic community of fiscal 
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austerity was formed and emphatically disseminated the neoliberal prescription 
that the 1988 Constitution is no longer compatible with the capacity of the Brazilian 
state budget. Policy-makers inserted these ideas of the epistemic community in the 
country’s constitution through amendments, and they were rapidly implemented 
during the governments of President Michel Temer and successor Jair Bolsonaro.
Including this introduction, the article is divided into five sections. The second sec-
tion examines the successes and limits of the new democratic developmentalism 
(2003-2016) to implement the policy framework set out in the 1988 Brazilian Con-
stitution. The third section explores who are the epistemic communities of fiscal 
austerity and their characteristics, followed by the fourth section with an analysis 
of how the ideas of these epistemic communities were inserted in the constitution 
under the governments of Michel Temer and Jair Bolsonaro. The fifth and last sec-
tion presents the final considerations.
The socio-political meaning of the 1988 Brazilian Constitution: 
advances and limitations of the new 
democratic developmentalism (2003-2016)
In contrast to the excluding legacy of authoritarian national-developmentalism 
(1964-1985) (Pinho, 2019; 2020), the promulgation of the 1988 Brazilian Consti-
tution reflected the struggle for a new comprehensive model of social protection. 
This model had an original component of social mobilization to expand social rights 
as part of the transition to democracy. In addition to the challenge of increasing 
social inclusion and combating poverty, the construction of new democratic and 
inclusive institutions began in an environment of accumulation of external and in-
ternal public debt. This process was marked by the primacy of conventional ortho-
doxy and pressure from international agencies (such as the International Monetary 
Fund – IMF) to cut spending, privatize public services, reduce the state’s size, and 
limit its power. The mobilization of social movements was crucial to include public 
pension, health, and social assistance as part of a comprehensive notion of social 
security, formalizing the concept of universal social rights as a fundamental part of 
citizenship (Fleury & Pinho, 2018).
Between 2003 and 2014, Brazil witnessed the most significant reduction in abso-
lute poverty in almost four decades. This achievement was possible through a polit-
ical strategy of increasing formal employment and increasing the weight of salaries 
in the economy by recovering the minimum wage’s real value, equivalent to more 
than 110% appreciation over two decades, with 70% appreciation between 2004-
2014. The number of formal workers earning a minimum wage increased from 2.5 
Revista Sociedade e Estado – Volume 36, Número 1, Janeiro/Abril 2021 199
million to 15 million from 1995 to 2014. Social security benefits linked to the min-
imum wage went from 10 to 20 million beneficiaries in the same period. While 
guaranteeing social rights, universal policies, and increased levels of well-being, 
the 1988 constitution did not structurally change wealth distribution patterns. The 
regressive tax framework prevailed, and the possibility of implementing a progres-
sive tax system was vetoed at the 1987 Constituent Assembly (Arretche, Marques & 
Faria, 2019; Kerstenetzky, 2017).
The limitations and uniqueness of the new democratic developmentalism (2003-
2016) result from this scenario. The approach refers to a social-democratic strategy 
that did not promote structural reforms and sought to change the excluding char-
acteristics of Brazilian capitalism while respecting the political party competition 
logic (Roberts, 2008). In addition to establishing alliances with political and social 
forces such as leftist parties, the progressive middle class, unions, and social and 
workers movements, it was inevitable to ally with archaic, conservative, and reac-
tionary political elites in order to obtain governability in the context of the coalition 
presidentialism (Abranches, 2018). The social dimension gained prominence. There 
was an expansion of access to the domestic mass consumption market, unlike what 
was observed in the exclusive model of authoritarian national developmentalism 
(1964-1985) and the pro-market reforms (that occurred from 1990 to 2002). In the 
pro-market reforms, social policies were submitted to the logic of fiscal austerity 
and monetary stabilization (Pinho, 2019).
The power of (unison) ideas voiced 
by epistemic communities of fiscal austerity
This section examines the role of the ideas put forward by the epistemic commu-
nities of fiscal austerity. However, it is first important to clarify the concept of epis-
temic communities. For the political scientist Peter Haas, an epistemic community 
is a network of professionals with knowledge and skills recognized in a specific field, 
able to subsidize policy implementation. Although the epistemic community gath-
ers professionals with different backgrounds, these participants share 
i. a set of normative beliefs and principles that offer a value-based 
foundation for collective social action; 
ii. causal beliefs that contribute to understanding the multiple links 
between possible political actions and desired results; 
iii. notions of validity that are intersubjective criteria for validating 
knowledge in their domain of experience; and 
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iv. a set of practices associated with an archetype of problems they 
have the professional ability to tackle. These professionals presum-
ably engage in solving these problems because they believe their ac-
tion contributes to improving human well-being (Haas, 1992).
The theoretical-conceptual framework above helps characterize, systematize, and 
operationalize this research object, both analytically and empirically. It indicates 
that, despite the differences and singularities of the epistemic communities of fis-
cal austerity in Brazil, they share the unequivocal belief that monetary stability and 
strict control of public spending are the paths to sustained growth and economic 
development. For these communities, the growth in public indebtedness suggests 
that austerity is the only alternative to avoid the Brazilian state’s insolvency, even 
if this implies de-constitutionalizing social rights and constitutionalizing fiscal aus-
terity. Therefore, it is crucial to understand, who are the actors and institutions 
within these epistemological communities? How do they work, and how are they 
organized? Who trains or finances them? What is their ability to influence the for-
mulation and implementation of policies? The following section characterizes each 
of the epistemological communities.
Large corporativist press and oligopolistic media
The mainstream Brazilian media is connected to the global networks of power, 
wealth, and technology (Castells, 1999). It receives funding from advertisers that 
constitutes major financial, commercial, and industrial corporations and obtains 
tax exemptions and government incentives. Numerous editorials and articles repro-
duce the neoliberal rhetoric of common knowledge. By lacking scientific and analyt-
ical rigor, large national newspapers recognize that, in the 2002 election campaign, 
Lula da Silva was successful in spreading a document entitled Carta ao povo bra-
sileiro (Letter to the Brazilian People), in which he promised to control inflation and 
demonstrate to financial market investors the commitment to continue and deepen 
the fiscal austerity policies of the previous government (Fernando Henrique Cardo-
so, 1995-2002). After his election, President Lula da Silva successfully put together 
a liberal-orthodox economic team, led by Antonio Palocci, in the Ministry of Fi-
nance, and Henrique Meirelles, in the Central Bank. The team strictly followed the 
premises of economic stabilization. These premises included high-interest rates to 
control inflation, fluctuating exchange rates, and an increase in the public sector’s 
primary surplus from 3.75% to 4.25% of GDP, surpassing the primary surplus target 
adopted during President Cardoso’s government. During the first term of Lula da 
Silva’s government (2003-2006), the public sector pension reform was approved. It 
was the same reform the previous government tried and failed to carry out. Howev-
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er, in his second term, with Dilma Rousseff as Chief of Staff, the interventionist and 
developmentalist manuals of the Workers’ Party were implemented, contributing 
to the disastrous heterodox economic policy of the new macroeconomic matrix. 
According to the large corporatist press and the oligopolistic media as epistemic 
communities, Lula da Silva and Dilma Rousseff used the worsening of the 2008 
international systemic financial crisis – generated with the bursting of the United 
States housing bubble – as an argument to adopt an uncontrolled increase in public 
spending. Thus, Lula da Silva and Rousseff laid the foundations for the biggest fiscal 
crisis in the country’s history (O Globo, September 17, 2015, February 23, 2017, 
April 01, 2017).
Therefore, this epistemic community used the argument of combating the corrup-
tion of the developmentalist governments and halting public debt growth to justify 
its support to the democratic rupture in 2016. The large corporatist press also sus-
tained the intensification of austerity policies carried out by President Michel Te-
mer and his successor Jair Bolsonaro. The editorial of one of the largest newspapers 
in the country, Folha de S. Paulo, offers strong evidence of this dynamic:
It is essential to containing the increase in public debt and eco-
nomic degradation. Spending cuts will have to be made with 
unprecedented radicalism, lest even worse nightmares become 
a reality, such as the specter of uncontrolled inflation. [...] Dra-
matic circumstances also demand a partial and temporary release 
of compulsory health and education expenditures, which would 
be accompanied by a careful review of these expenditures in the 
future [...] The country, however, has no choice. President Dilma 
Rousseff, too: she will have no choice if she falls under the weight 
of the crisis, but to abandon her presidential responsibilities and, 
eventually, her position (Folha de S. Paulo, Set. 2015).
Industrial entrepreneurs
A conciliatory stance toward industrial entrepreneurs marked the mandates of 
President Lula da Silva (PT) (2003-2010). In order to stabilize the currency, the pre-
vious government – Fernando Henrique Cardoso (PSDB) (1995-2002) – adopted 
fiscal (cut in public spending) and monetary (increase in interest rate) policies that 
penalized these entrepreneurs. President Lula worked to get closer to the produc-
tive sector, starting by choosing a businessman of the textile sector, José Alencar, 
as his vice-president. Also, the former president created the Economic and Social 
Development Council (CDES), gathering the main players of the national industry. 
During Lula’s second term, the government counted on a virtuous cycle of economic 
growth to boost public investment in infrastructure, promoting a resumption of the 
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industrial policy. Some examples of policies are the Growth Acceleration Program 
(PAC I and II), the Policy on Industry, Technology, and Foreign Trade (PITCE – 2003-
2007), and the Productive Development Policy (PDP – 2008-2010) (PINHO, 2019).
However, the following president, Dilma Rousseff (PT) (2011-2016)2, faced an ad-
verse international and macroeconomic environment – Eurozone crisis and a slow-
down in the commodities boom – and did not keep the same level of public invest-
ment. The economic model implemented in 2012 and deepened in 2014 was the 
so-called Agenda Fiesp (Fiesp stands for the Federation of Industries of the State 
of São Paulo) (Carvalho, 2018) or the new macroeconomic matrix. The model ad-
opted measures such as interest reduction, tax exemptions through tax waivers of 
billions of Brazilian reais3 , expansion of credit from the National Development Bank 
(BNDES), and freezing electricity tariffs. The policies’ results were ineffective due to 
economic slowdown and fiscal deterioration (Boschi & Pinho, 2019a; 2019b).
In October 2015, Vice President Michel Temer, before his official break with Pres-
ident Rousseff’s government, released the document Uma ponte para o futuro (a 
bridge to the future) (2015). The text would become his government platform (and 
the platform of the current president Jair Bolsonaro). As explained below, the plat-
form contains a set of austerity measures aimed at deepening pro-market reforms 
(1990-2002) (Pinho, 2019).
Michel Temer approached the business community and obtained the support of 
several class associations in the impeachment process of President Dilma Rousseff. 
Among the organizations supporting the process were the Federation of Industries 
of the State of São Paulo (Fiesp), the Federation of Industries of the State of Rio de 
Janeiro (Firjan), the Brazilian National Confederation of Industry (CNI), the Federa-
tion of Commerce of the State of São Paulo (Fecomércio). Fiesp launched in 2015 a 
campaign4 against CPMF, a tax on financial transactions implemented to cover the 
deficit in the federal budget. Fiesp’s president, Paulo Skaf, asked Congress’s support 
for the federation’s campaign, which expanded its scope and took an important role 
in President Rousseff’s impeachment process (Boschi & Pinho, 2019a; 2019b). Fiesp 
not only advocated the extinction of the CPMF but demanded fiscal adjustment 
with government cuts and a commitment to not increasing the tax burden. In Paulo 
Skaf’s words:
Since she did not resign as we asked, from now on, we are asking 
for impeachment. It is unacceptable that Brazil is adrift. There is 
a total lack of control, and the government is not concerned with 
companies, with unemployment, only with remaining in power (O 
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Orthodox economists (or monetarists)
Elected in 2002 and inaugurated in 2003, the government of President Lula da Silva 
appointed liberal-orthodox economists to the central positions of the economic 
bureaucracy, such as the Central Bank (Henrique Meirelles), the Ministry of Finance 
(Antonio Palocci). President Lula da Silva actually deepened fiscal austerity poli-
cies initiated in the previous government. Henrique Meirelles, BankBoston’s for-
mer president, was elected federal deputy running for PSDB (political party rival to 
President Lula’s PT) and received full government approval and independence to 
assemble his team. Meirelles preserved many of the Central Bank’s directors who 
had served in the previous government, such as Beny Parnes, Alexandre Schwarts-
man, and Ilan Goldfajn. These directors were experienced orthodox economists 
with close ties to the financial system and had committed to international investors 
to continue President Cardoso’s macroeconomic policies. It is worth mentioning the 
also orthodox economists Joaquim Levy and Marcos Lisboa, respectively, secretary 
of the treasury and secretary of economic policy, who were trained in universities 
in the US, and had experience in the private sector and multilateral institutions 
(Campello, 2015).
At the end of 2005, the neoliberal convention (Erber, 2011) lost space in Lula’s 
government, and the developmentalist approach emerged. In this period, Dilma 
Rousseff was appointed Chief of Staff, Guido Mantega took office as Ministry of 
Finance replacing Antônio Palocci, and Luciano Coutinho took office as President of 
BNDES, promoting negotiations among the industry, construction conglomerates, 
and the productive sector. In addition, the role of state-owned banks and enter-
prises gained importance again after having lost relevance during the government 
of President Cardoso (1995-2002) (Loureiro, Santos & Gomide, 2011). The change 
of path in Lula’s macroeconomic policy led to fiscal expansion, deepened by Dilma 
Rousseff’s new macroeconomic matrix (2011-2016), triggered countless criticisms 
in the mainstream press through news articles signed by orthodox economists5 
(Pinho, 2019).
These neoliberal economists and ideologists working for different governments, 
think tanks, consulting companies, and multilateral organizations point out that 
the negative changes in fiscal institutions started in President Lula’s second man-
date (2007-2010). For these professionals, the previous reforms in the 1980s and 
1990s granted Brazilian public finances a high institutional standard, marked by the 
acceptance of austerity policies put forward by the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and the Fiscal Responsibility Law (LRF/2000). The changes in fiscal institutions 
intensified after the 2008 global financial crisis when the government interpreted 
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the crisis as a sign of pro-market policies’ failure. In the conception of the epistemic 
communities of orthodox economists (or monetarists), Dilma Rousseff’s disastrous 
developmentalist experience and practices – named creative accounting – affect-
ed fiscal institutions’ robustness. The deterioration of public accounts jeopardized 
businesses and the financial market’s trust, repressing investment, paralyzing proj-
ects, and reducing the country’s credit rating. The PT governments’ policy of con-
stantly valuing the minimum wage above labor productivity reduced the expect-
ed profits and decapitalized companies, increasing their costs. This phenomenon 
had a negative impact on economic growth by increasing current public spending 
(Mendes, 2014; Nóbrega, 2016; Salto & Almeida, 2016; Tollini, 2016).
The Independent Fiscal Institution (IFI) is an agency created to monitor Brazil’s fiscal 
and budgetary activities. Its executive director is economist Felipe Scudeler Salto. 
According to the IFI, spending on pension and benefits, education, health, and so-
cial assistance represents 75% of the Union budg excluding debt services. The debt 
will correspond to 93.3% of GDP in 2024 and 85.5% of GDP by 2030. However, this 
evolution will depend heavily on the capacity to stop the growth of government 
expenditure in order to contain the expansion of debt and the probable insolvency 
of the Brazilian State (IFI, 2017).
Chart 1
Gross Government Debt (GGD) in % of GDP and primary result 
in current BRL billions (right axis) – 2017/20306
 Source: Instituição Fiscal Independente (2017) (Independent Fiscal Institution)
Statements about the unsustainability of the public debt carry an ideological or 
moral bias, typical of most neoliberal assumptions when associating debt with sin – 
as the German sociologist, Max Weber (2004), showed in the classic The protestant 
6. This scenario was 
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ethic and the spirit of capitalism. There is controversy in the political economy liter-
ature about the supposed exacerbated nature of the Brazilian public debt.
Different from liberal and monetarist economists mentioned above, who advocate 
cutting spending on welfare to ensure fiscal balance, some Marxist economists ar-
gue that the social security retraction is a consequence of tax breaks on social con-
tributions, reduction of payroll costs, decrease in public revenue, as well as amor-
tization of public debt, which are measures that favor speculative investment and 
the rentier and financial capital (Salvador, 2017). 
Liberal-Conservative Parliamentary Coalition
Dilma Rousseff (PT) was reelected in the 2014 presidential elections, defeating Aécio 
Neves (PSDB) by a small margin of votes. In the same electoral process, Brazilians 
elected “the most conservative Congress of the period post-1964” (O Estado de S. 
Paulo, October 06, 2014, our translation) – which comprises the years of the mil-
itary dictatorship and the period of re-democratization. In the 2014 elections, the 
parliamentary front related to unions shrank from 86 to 46 federal deputies. Recent 
data from the Inter-Union Parliamentary Advisory Department (Diap) showed that 
the 2018 elections reinforced this trend. The elected Congress can be characterized 
as (1) liberal, from an economic point of view, (2) fiscalist, regarding public manage-
ment, (3) conservative, in terms of moral and religious values, (4) more right-wing, 
from an ideological point of view, and (5) lagging behind regarding the environ-
ment and human rights. As for the elected policymakers’ ideological profile, social 
class, and themes of interest, the conservative bias and the growth in the number 
of right-wing politicians in Congress are clear. The number of policymakers from 
the working class largely reduced, whereas the evangelical parliamentary front and 
the parliamentary front pro-gun rights (known as bancada da bala) gained mem-
bers and strength. Also, newly elected policymakers reinvigorated the agricultural 
and business parliamentary fronts. In the Chamber of Deputies, the increase in the 
number of right-wing deputies stood out. The group was formed by 210 deputies 
representing the following parties: PSL (Social Liberal Party), DEM (Democrats), PP 
(Progressives), PR (Party of the Republic), PRB (Brazilian Republican Party), PSC (So-
cial Christian Party), Novo (New Party), Patriota (Patriot), PRP (Progressive Republi-
can Party), PTC (Christian Labor Party), and DC (Christian Democracy). 
Despite having lost some members, as in the case of the agricultural parliamenta-
ry group, the conservative groups left the 2018 elections stronger. This happened 
because the winning presidential candidate Jair Bolsonaro supported their agenda 
during the campaign and because the evangelical and pro-gun rights parliamentary 
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groups gained members and strength. The business parliamentary group also man-
aged to keep a large number of seats (DIAP, 2018).
Liberal organizations and movements of middle and upper classes
Liberal organizations and movements gathering the middle and upper classes 
played a fundamental role in spreading liberal ideas and leading demonstrations 
for the impeachment of President Dilma Rousseff in 2015 and 2016. Examples of 
these movements are Vem pra Rua (Come to the Street), Revoltados Online (On-
line Revolted), the Movimento Brasil Livre (MBL) (Free Brazil Movement). Across 
the country and in important parts of large cities such as Avenida Paulista (in São 
Paulo), and Copacabana Beach (Rio de Janeiro), protesters installed inflatable dolls 
with the images of President Lula da Silva (PT) dressed as prisoner, and President 
Dilma Rousseff, and performed symbolic burials of the authorities. Politicians such 
as Aécio Neves, Geraldo Alckmin, and José Serra, all from the party PSDB, were 
present at the demonstrations. There were numerous posters with messages such 
as “Fora PT” (Workers’ Party get out), “Intervenção Constitucional (Artigo 142)” 
(claiming a military intervention, supposedly supported by article 142 of 1988 Bra-
zilian Constitution), “Fora Comunismo” (No communism), and “Olavo de Carvalho 
tem razão” (“Olavo de Carvalho is right,” referring to an ideologist with influence 
among the Brazilian far right-wing) (Folha de S. Paulo, 2015).
According to Camila Rocha, such movements in defense of economic liberalism are 
predominantly led by young university students and liberal professionals from the 
middle and upper classes. They have been coordinated through the Internet and 
using communication technologies since the creation of Orkut, in 2006. Organi-
zations forming a network of ultraliberal think tanks such as Instituto Mises Bra-
sil (IMB) and Instituto Millenium organizationally and financially supported these 
movements, contributing to training activists and building and institutionalizing an 
ultraliberal counter-public. These think tanks are maintained with funds offered by 
businesses such as Grupo Abril, Organizações Globo, Grupo Ultra, Grupo Gerdau, 
Grupo Évora. Finally, the emergence of the June 2013 demonstrations all over the 
country (which started with demands such as reducing public transportation pric-
es and against corruption) represented an opportunity for this ultraliberal count-
er-public to gather unsatisfied sectors of the population. After President Rousseff’s 
re-election in 2014, this counter-public worked to steer the protesters’ agenda to-
ward the president’s impeachment (Rocha, 2019).
Thus, as of the 2016 democratic rupture, the rhetoric, discourses, and ideas envis-
aged by the epistemic communities were unified and later inserted in the constitu-
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tion based on a radical liberal-orthodox program, carried out by the governments 
of presidents Temer and Bolsonaro, as analyzed below.
The political constitutionalization of the 
epistemic communities of fiscal austerity’s ideas 
and the deconstitutionalization of social rights
President Dilma Rousseff’s impeachment in 2016 occurred amidst a severe eco-
nomic crisis. Brazilian GDP fell 7.2%, and the period 2015/2016 reflected the worst 
recession since 1948 (Valor Econômico, 2017), followed by a slow economic recov-
ery. The president tried to get closer to the business community and the financial 
sector carrying out a tough fiscal adjustment. The result, however, was counterpro-
ductive (Pinho, 2019). The decline of workers’ rights began during President Rous-
seff’s second mandate in 2015, especially after the publication of provisional mea-
sures (MP) 664 and 665, without establishing a dialogue with society. The MPs put 
limits on the process of granting pensions for death (including in the case of public 
servants), sickness benefit, unemployment benefit, and salary bonus (Diap, 2018). 
Such restrictive measures were combated by sectors to the left of the president’s 
own political party PT. Senator Paulo Rocha (Workers’ Party – PT, representative 
from the State of Pará) was responsible for reporting the two MPs, acknowledged 
at the time: “It was a mistake for the government not to dialogue with the various 
sectors of workers” (Câmara dos Deputados, 2015).
The adverse economic situation and the support gained from the epistemological 
communities took Vice President Michel Temer to the presidency. President Rous-
seff’s impeachment was, in fact, a parliamentary coup, adopting deceptive dem-
ocratic legal procedures, and counting on the support of the National Congress, 
the Judiciary Branch, and the Public Ministry (Santos, 2017). The fall of Rousseff’s 
government opened the path for the constitutionalization of the fiscal austerity re-
gime and the deconstitutionalization of social rights enshrined during the period of 
Brazil’s re-democratization. Temer’s government approved the New Fiscal Regime 
(Constitutional Amendment 95/2016, derived from the constitutional amendment 
bill 55/2016), making it impossible to allocate enough resources to fund social pol-
icies within the standards established by the 1988 Constitution for 20 years. Once 
applied, the law will reduce the federal government’s primary expenditure from 
around 20% of GDP in 2016 to something around 16% of GDP by 2026, or 12% in 
2036, except for financial expenses related to the payment of debt interest. This 
policy of permanently reducing spending criminalizes the Keynesian countercyclical 
fiscal policy to face economic crises and surpasses the contractionary fiscal policies 
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of the US, the most liberal nation in the world. The US adopted the Budget Control 
Act, which is valid for approximately ten years and established by ordinary law. The 
legislation determines the reduction of the budgeted expenditures yearly, aiming 
to progressively decrease spending on social security, unemployment insurance, re-
fundable tax credits, and veterans’ benefits (Austeridade e Retrocesso, 2016; Rossi 
& Dweck, 2016; 2018; Tavares & Silva, 2020).
The outsourcing law and the labor reform7 defended by bankers, economists, busi-
nesspeople, and the mainstream press in constant editorials were implemented 
without a broad debate in society. The argument behind such changes was the 
need to overcome the archaism of the Consolidation of labor laws (CLT/1943) and 
render the country more competitive in the face of global demands. Some of the 
most important points changed with the labor reform were (1) agreements be-
tween employer and employee prevail over labor laws, (2) annual leave can be tak-
en in chunks (rather than all in one go or divided into a maximum of two chunks of a 
minimum of ten days each, as in the previous law), (3) the possibility of establishing 
intermittent employment – paid on an hourly basis, and (4) the use of temporary 
work contracts for all companies activities, both essential and support activities (O 
Globo, 2016; Setubal, 2017).
Three years after the labor reform passed, empirical evidence shows a deteriora-
tion of public institutions responsible for labor law enforcement such as the Labor 
Court and the Ministry of Labor, which was extinguished under President Bolsona-
ro’s government. The reform brought incentives for illegal contracts, increased the 
labor market’s precariousness, informality, self-employment, and the number of 
discouraged workers (called desalentados) (Ipea, 2019; Nexo, November 07, 2019). 
Although the labor law changed substantially, with a strong tendency to erode the 
institutional legacy of Vargas (Getulio Vargas, president between 1930-1945, and 
from 1951 to 1954), based on the state corporatism that regulated capital/labor 
relations (Boschi & Pinho, 2019a; 2019b), the government of President Temer was 
unable to approve the pension reform. Temer worked to continually disseminate 
throughout the country, in digital and mainstream media, the discourse of social 
security deficit or the notion of “reform today to guarantee tomorrow” (Exame, 
2017).
Jair Bolsonaro’s ultraliberal and conservative coalition, which took office in January 
2019, in addition to being able to approve the pension reform, reduce benefits sub-
stantially, and hamper access to social security and assistance benefits, has deep-
ened the austerity measures of the previous government. Enormous power has 
been left in the hands of the Ministry of Economy, led by the ultraliberal economist 
7. The President 
of the Chamber of 
Deputies, Rodrigo 
Maia (Federal Deputy 
from Rio de Janeiro, 
Democrats - DEM), 
worked to approve 
the reform. Maia said 
that Labor Courts 
should not exist, and 
that labor judges 
make irresponsible 
decisions (El País 
Brasil, March 23, 
2017).
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Paulo Guedes, an exponent of the financial market and notorious follower of the 
1970s Chicago School’s assumptions. The government has been making drastic bud-
get cuts and disrupting public policies on social participation, human and minority 
rights, education, foreign affairs, and the environment (Fleury & Pinho, 2019).
Final considerations
This article was based on a robust theoretical-conceptual framework and empirical 
research, analyzing the construction of discourses and the institutionalization of 
ideas of epistemic communities of fiscal austerity and the impact of such ideas on 
the welfare state. The study demonstrated the operationalization of the epistemic 
communities’ ideas and how they were inserted in the Brazilian constitution, start-
ing with a parliamentary coup in 2016 and followed by constitutional amendments 
put forward by the liberal-conservative coalition formed in the governments of 
presidents Temer and Bolsonaro.
After the first mandate of President Lula da Silva, several segments of society started 
to assertively disseminate their ideas and assumption on how Brazil should manage 
its macroeconomy and formulate and implement public policies. The sectors expos-
ing and advocating ideas in the public sphere were academia, political parties and 
institutions with a liberal-conservative profile, orthodox economists, mainstream 
press, the oligopolistic media, industrial entrepreneurs, the financial market, uni-
versity students, and liberal professionals from the middle and upper classes. In this 
period, President Lula da Silva adopted a pro-developmentalist approach for the 
macroeconomic policy even though maintaining fiscal austerity policies as a struc-
tural constriction imposed by financial globalization. It is worth noting that, as of 
2014, there was a significant drop in the number of policymakers in parliamentary 
fronts related to unions or workers. In contrast, the number of liberal-conservative 
party coalition in the Congress increased, with parliamentary fronts focused on re-
ligious groups’ interests (particularly Neo-Pentecostal), pro-gun rights, and defense 
of agribusiness sectors, and refractory to universal social policies, human rights, 
and environmental protection.
The epistemic communities’ agenda acquired a higher level of dissemination and 
radicalization during President Rousseff’s government, leading to a fracture of the 
political-economic coalition supporting her administration. It was in this period, in 
2015, that the then Vice President Michel Temer launched the austerity program 
Uma ponte para o futuro (a bridge to the future), consolidating these ideas. This 
study demonstrated how this agenda was embodied in political practice, empha-
sizing the deep fiscal austerity started during Rousseff’s second term. The research 
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was based on the hypothesis that the establishment of an epistemic community of 
fiscal austerity – from the end of Lula da Silva’s first mandate, in 2006, until the im-
peachment of Rousseff in 2016 – emphatically disseminated the neoliberal assump-
tion that the 1988 Constitution is no longer compatible with the capacity of the 
Brazilian state budget. The study fills an important gap in the literature, presenting, 
in an interdisciplinary way, how the epistemic communities operationalized the lib-
eral-orthodox and monetarist discourse until its institutionalization in public poli-
cies by a liberal-conservative political-economic coalition committed to the inten-
sification of fiscal discipline. A political economy of public policies was carried out, 
bringing together the dimensions of the ideas’ influence on the implementation of 
welfare policies, the political economy of development, and the political-economic 
coalitions supporting austerity measures.
The different epistemic communities share intersubjective understandings, have a 
converging mode of knowledge, share reasoning patterns, have a political project 
based on similar values, share causal beliefs and associated discursive practices, 
and converge in their commitment to knowledge production and application. As 
epistemic communities connect globally, control over knowledge and information 
is an essential dimension of power. The diffusion of new ideas and information can 
lead to new behavior patterns and be an important determinant of international 
political coordination. They share the same worldview (or episteme) and constitute 
channels through which new ideas circulate from societies to governments, as well 
as from country to country, and help to formulate public policies (Haas, 1992).
Based on the theoretical and conceptual framework developed by Peter Haas, a 
pioneer in formulating the concept of epistemic communities, this study puts for-
ward the argument that epistemic communities of fiscal austerities have their par-
ticularities but widely share a belief on fiscal austerity. They massively spread ideas 
in line with the free market, individual freedom, free initiative, and oppose state 
intervention in the economy. They seek to influence the formulation of public poli-
cies toward a project of power based on the intensification of pro-market reforms, 
even if this means constriction of public spending, the deconstitutionalization of 
social rights, and sacrifice for the majority of the population. This article shows 
that, within the scope of political institutionality, the broad political-economic and 
societal coalition around the epistemic communities of fiscal austerity has managed 
to convert their ideas into public policies. Their interests are represented by an au-
thoritarian, liberal-conservative, and reactionary project of power endorsed in the 
2018 presidential elections in Brazil.
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